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BTC Reused Addresses Now Hold 4.33M BTC, Keys Exposed

Reused Bitcoin addresses permanently publish their public keys on-chain, the exact weakness a quantum decryption event would target first. Roughly one in five BTC now sits in that position.

Reused Bitcoin addresses now hold 4.33M BTC, up from 3.79M a year ago, covering roughly 21.5% of circulating supply. Each reuse exposes the address's public key on-chain. Until coins move from an address, the key sits behind a hash; every subsequent spend from the same address broadcasts it permanently.

The exposure matters because reused addresses are the bucket a future quantum decryption event would target first. A quantum computer running Shor's algorithm against a published public key could derive the private key and walk away with any remaining balance at that address. The at-risk set has been growing for twelve straight months.

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Frequently asked questions

  1. Why does Bitcoin address reuse expose public keys?

    Until an address is spent from for the first time, its public key is hidden behind a hash. Once it is spent from, the public key is broadcast on-chain and stays visible permanently, and reusing the address stacks more exposure on the same key.

  2. How much Bitcoin sits in reused addresses today?

    Roughly 4.33M BTC, up from 3.79M a year ago and now around 21.5% of circulating supply.

  3. Why is an exposed public key a quantum-computing risk?

    A sufficiently powerful quantum computer running Shor's algorithm against a published public key could derive the private key and walk away with any remaining balance at that address.

  4. Does address reuse hurt Bitcoin privacy in the present tense?

    Yes. Reused addresses let chain analysts cluster transactions into single wallets, eroding the pseudonymity the network is supposed to provide.

  5. What can a holder do to reduce address-reuse exposure?

    Moving funds to a fresh, never-spent address hides the public key behind a hash again, removing the address from the at-risk set.

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Aggregated from Glassnode · Verified · Last refreshed 1h ago
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